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ABSTRACT 
Reliability engineering is an integral part in the 
design of safety critical systems. Especially 
spacecraft that cannot receive physical maintenance 
once delivered into orbit heavily require a fault 
tolerant design approach. In order to overcome these 
challenges, concepts from the domain of Fault 
Detection, Isolation and Recovery (FDIR) are 
employed. With this paper we present our approach 
for bringing Model Based Systems Engineering into 
the realm of reliability engineering using the Virtual 
Satellite (VirSat) framework. The tool we are 
developing for this purpose is called VirSat FDIR.  
In this paper, we discuss a Conceptual Data Model 
for modelling important aspects of the FDIR domain 
that we have conceived and implemented for VirSat 
FDIR. It supports modelling of FDIR faults, 
recovery, analysis and requirements. We further 
discuss how these models can be actively used for the 
purpose of generation of FDIR artefacts and the 
process of Verification and Validation. 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
In the past years a lot of effort has been invested into 
enabling Model Based Systems Engineering (MBSE) 
for the whole life cycle of a spacecraft. Part of these 
efforts is Virtual Satellite 4 (VirSat4) [1]. VirSat4 is a 
software framework that allows for the integration of 
various different engineering processes across the 
individual phases of spacecraft design and operation, as 
well as the different disciplines. 
 
An important discipline in the design of safety critical 
systems such as spacecraft is reliability engineering. No 
matter how well designed a system is, it must always be 
able to deal with the presence of faults to some extent. 
In order to raise trust in handling such faults, concepts 
from the domain of Fault Detection, Isolation and 
Recovery (FDIR) are employed. 
 
With this paper we present our approach for bringing 
MBSE into the realm of reliability engineering using the 
Virtual Satellite framework. The tool we are developing 
for this purpose is called VirSat FDIR. Virtual Satellite 
provides a generic systems engineering language in 
which a Conceptual Data Model (CDM) capturing one 
specific engineering aspect can be described. In this 
paper, we discuss such a Conceptual Data Model for the 
FDIR domain that we have developed for VirSat FDIR. 
 
The tool currently focuses on the modelling of faults by 
means of Fault Trees (FT). Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) is 
a commonly used methodology for performing state-of-
the-art failure analysis [2]. The resulting Fault Trees are 
acyclic graphs that describe how faults propagate 
through the components and subsystems of a system and 
eventually lead to a top level failure. VirSat FDIR 
supports the graphical modelling of Fault Trees and the 
import of textural descriptions of Fault Trees for 
integrating supplier data. Furthermore, it also supports 
the generation of Failure Modes and Effects Analysis 
(FMEA) tables based on the ECSS standards.  
 
In conjunction to fault modelling, the tool also features 
modelling support to deal with the recovery related 
aspects of FDIR. For this purpose we have introduced a 
concept we call Recovery Automaton. It models the 
underlying decision process guiding which recovery 
action should be executed upon observing some fault. 
The tool also implements the synthesis procedure that 
we have described in [3]. It takes as input a modelled 
Fault Tree and aims to generate recovery strategies 
optimized towards reliability. The focus is in particular 
in regards to redundancy management.  
 
Due to being conceptualized with the generic 
engineering language, VirSat FDIR can be used to 
annotate any Virtual Satellite study with fault and 
recovery information without requiring domain specific 
knowledge about the models that are being annotated. 
This also means that the tool can be used as soon as in 
the early phase A studies and also in the later phases of 
the spacecraft life cycle. Furthermore, as Virtual 
Satellite is made with concurrent engineering in mind, 
VirSat FDIR inherits this capability and can be 
employed in parallel to the creation of the main system 
model.  
 
With the initiative of the VirSat FDIR software we not 
only want to model FDIR concepts but also actively 
employ these models to assess the FDIR design and 
perform verification and validation (V&V) on it. 
Towards this goal, we support performing two forms of 
analysis: Reliability Analysis, a quantitative form of 
analysis that requires precise quantitative information 
such as the failure rates of the base faults. And 
Minimum Cutset Analysis, a qualitative form of 
analysis that only requires the underlying Fault Tree 
structure. 
 
 2. PAPER STRUCTURE 
The paper is structured as follows: Section 3 of this 
paper gives an introduction over the topic of FDIR and 
fault trees. An introduction on Virtual Satellite and its 
generic engineering language is given in Section 4. 
VirSat FDIR and the conceptual data model driving it 
are then introduced in Section 5. Here we also discuss 
how to deal with other interesting aspects such as 
employing configuration control on the level of fault 
trees. Going into the topic of generation, we continue in 
Section 6 with what kind of artefact data we can 
generate from our models. We finally conclude in 
Section 7 with a summary of this paper and follow up 
with an outlook to future plans. 
 
3. BACKGROUND ON FDIR & FAULT TREES 
The purpose of FDIR lies in keeping a system in a 
stable and operational state, even in the presence of 
faults. A fault can be any kind of system anomaly. 
Examples for such faults can be equipment failures, 
wrong sensor readings, external interferences, random 
bit flips and many more. However, not every fault is 
necessary a failure. A failure is an actual loss of a 
mission critical function. The task of FDIR is to find 
faults in the system and prevent them from turning into 
failures. While some of the following steps are optional 
and sometimes omitted, performing FDIR generally 
means applying the following procedural approach [4]: 
 
- Monitor the system to detect the occurrence of 
faults. 
- Identify the fault and localize it within the system. 
- Isolate the fault and prevent further propagation 
into other parts of the system. 
- Perform recovery actions to reconfigure the 
 system and return it into a stable state. 
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Figure 1. Interaction between system and FDIR 
In order to derive how faults relate to each other and 
eventually lead to a system wide failure, failure analysis 
techniques such as Fault Tree Analysis can be 
employed. In general, Fault Trees are graphs consisting 
of two types of nodes representing events and gates. The 
root node, or top level event (TLE), usually represents 
the event of a system failure whereas the leaves of the 
tree model the event of individual components failing. 
The leaves are also called basic events (BE). They 
correspond to a Boolean variable where false represents 
the initial state of no failure. The variable is considered 
true in case of a failure event. The branches of the trees 
are represented by the gates performing operations on 
the events. Fault propagation in FTs starts at the BEs 
points over the gates and ends in the TLE. 
 
One of the very basic types of FTs are Static Fault Trees 
(SFT). They employ Boolean algebra to combine 
various different failure events by AND and OR 
operations, often graphically represented as gates, until 
they sum up to the overall system failure. The failure 
events are usually related to faulty components of the 
system. Applying this methodology, statements such as 
“The system fails if component A and component B 
fail” can be modelled and refined to arbitrary levels of 
precision. 
 
A particular extension is the notion of Dynamic Fault 
Trees (DFT). It introduces temporal understanding and 
new features to analyse redundancy concepts known as 
spare management. Accordingly DFTs define a new 
SPARE gate to model that some faulty component or 
subsystem is replaced by a spare from a set of redundant 
parts. In the common understanding of DFTs, the order 
in which such a spare is chosen is deterministic and 
defined at design time by the reliability engineer. 
 
With the addition of spares, DFTs also introduce a new 
node state. In SFTs nodes only have two states: Failed 
or operational. In DFTs a node can be either failed, 
active (operational) or dormant (operational). A node 
that is an unactivated spare is dormant, all other nodes 
are activated. Together with this state, failure rates for 
failing actively and failing dormantly can be defined for 
every BE. These rates are then used for calculating 
measures of interest such as the probability of the top-
level failure after some time (reliability). 
 
4. VIRTUAL SATELLITE 4 
Virtual Satellite 4 is a concurrent engineering tool used 
at the concurrent engineering facility (CEF) at the 
German Aerospace Center (DLR). It implements an 
MBSE approach envisioned to cover the whole lifecycle 
of a satellite, starting from its initial design to the 
operational phase. 
 
A cornerstone for ensuring modularity, reusability and a 
high level of semantical precision is the notion of a 
conceptual data model (CDM), or simply “concept”. A 
CDM is a meta-model providing the language for 
capturing and defining a specific aspect in the satellite 
model. In contrast to generic modelling languages such 
as SysML or UML, a CDM may be specific to a certain 
phase or to a certain engineering discipline. In the 
technical memorandum ECSS-E-TM-10-23 provided by 
the European Cooperation for Space Standardization 
(ECSS) a CDM is defined as a 
 
“data model that captures the end-user needs in the 
end-user terms”. 
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Figure 2. Virtual Satellite database growing along the phases 
The high-level of specialization enables CDMs to be 
semantically precise and restricts models such that those 
with an unclear interpretation cannot be created.  An 
example for a CDM that is actively being employed in 
the CEF is described in [5]. This CDM is used for 
creating Phase 0/A satellite models. Within the 
framework of the S2TEP project, recent advances have 
been achieved for bringing VirSat into phase B studies.  
 
In VirSat4, CDMs can be described using its Generic 
Systems Engineering Language (GSEL) [6]. The GSEL 
features two types of elements: StructuralElements and 
Categories.  
 
- StructuralElements are used to describe system 
decomposition into its various subsystems and parts 
and relate parts with each other. An example for a 
relationship between StructuralElements is a 
product in a product list typing its actual 
instantiation in the satellite model.  
- Categories, on the other hand, are used for tagging 
parts with the actual data information. Examples for 
attachable Categories are mass values, power 
consumption, interfaces or relevant for this work 
FDIR information.  
 
To enable concurrent engineering, each instance of a 
StructuralElement is tagged with an owner. Only the 
owner is allowed to edit this instance and assign 
Categories to it. By this manner, merge conflicts are 
avoided.  
 
A VirSat4 extension is a VirSat4 application equipped 
with a set of CDMs. VirSat4 extensions may share 
common concepts or be completely independent. When 
a VirSat4 extension accesses a repository, its concepts 
are stored in the repository alongside the satellite data 
model. This enables different VirSat4 extensions that 
are equipped with different sets of CDMs to 
communicate with each other. Fig. 3 depicts the 
architecture of having different VirSat4 extensions 
operating on a common repository. 
 
Concept A Concept B
VirSat Application A
Concept B Concept C Concept D
VirSat Application B
<<Access>>
<<Access>>
<<Access>>
VirSat Application C
Concept A Concept D Concept D
Concept C
Concept B
Concept A
Repository
Satellite 
Model
 
Figure 3. Virtual Satellite 4 architecture with different VirSat4 extensions operating on the same repository
  
5. FDIR CONCEPTUAL DATA MODEL 
In this section we present the main contribution of this 
paper: Our Conceptual Data Model for the FDIR 
domain. The CDM deals with mainly two FDIR aspects: 
Modelling faults and modelling the recovery from them. 
Detection and Isolation are not considered in the FDIR 
CDM. However, due to the high importance of 
detection, it is one of the major future goals to support 
modelling it as well. Overall, the current FDIR CDM 
can be split up into of three sections: 
- The Fault CDM, 
- The Recovery CDM 
- And the Requirements and analysis CDM. 
 
The CDM is independent of the concrete structural 
decomposition of the system and only contains 
Categories. The actual system decomposition in terms 
of StructuralElements has to be defined in a separate 
concept. In the following the word Component is used 
to refer to any element of such a structural 
decomposition. To provide out of the box modelling 
capabilities, VirSat FDIR is equipped with the FDIR 
CDM and a default concept for modelling the system 
decomposition. The default structural decomposition 
and how it can be used for configuration control is 
discussed in section 5.2 
The core element of the Fault CDM is the Fault 
Category. It can be assigned to any Component. To 
model the cause of a fault, a meta-model following 
DFTs is employed. The BasicEvent Category models 
direct causes of a Fault and is supplied with a failure 
rates and, if it is a transient event, with a repair rate. For 
indirect causes, every Fault is also equipped with an FT; 
the fault being the root of the FT. Every FT contains its 
local graph data, i.e. its edges and the gates describing 
the propagation from the lower level faults to the root 
fault. Fig. 4 summarizes the Fault CDM and illustrates 
the relations between the Categories. 
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Figure 4. Section of the FDIR CDM for modelling faults 
To support provision of fault information from 
suppliers, VirSat FDIR can import (and export) FTs 
described in the textual Galileo format [7]. The 
language has been implemented as a Domain Specific 
Language using XText. The textual format is also used 
to convert the FT model into an input representation for 
external FT analyser tools. VirSat FDIR comes with a 
native but slow implementation for analysing FTs. For 
high performance analysis, the tool supports using the 
STORM [8] tool as a solver backend. 
For modelling the recovery aspect we define an object 
called a RecoveryAutomaton [3] (RA). An RA is a 
Mealy automaton that listens to the events produced by 
an FT and outputs a list of recovery actions. Through 
the Fault CDM, the system is abstracted to a pure fault 
perspective. In our model, this abstracts the System-
FDIR interaction initially depicted in Fig. 1 to a FT-RA 
interaction. Fig. 5 illustrates the simplified view. 
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Figure 5: Interaction between Recovery Automaton and 
Fault Tree 
The RA uses guarded transitions. If the events listed by 
the guards occur in the FT, the RA transitions to a new 
state and outputs a list of recovery actions. A 
RecoveryAction is an abstract Category providing an 
interface for modelling domain specific recovery 
behaviour. It is envisioned that more RecoveryActions 
from specific domains can be added by extending the 
FDIR CDM. The overall Recovery CDM and its 
relation to the elements of other CDMs are illustrated in 
Fig. 6.  
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Figure 6. The CDM section for modelling recovery 
 Per default, the FDIR CDM provides the ClaimAction. 
The ClaimAction represents the action of a SPARE gate 
claiming a spare. Going forward, we hope to be capable 
of extending the palette of default recovery actions 
included in the FDIR CDM. Current efforts involve are 
going towards providing a RecoveyAction modelling a 
transition into the Satellite Safe Mode. 
Since both FTs and RAs are objects designed with 
graphical representation in mind, modelling them in a 
graphical manner is highly desirable. VirSat FDIR 
supports a connection to the Graphiti framework for 
providing diagrams for FTs and RAs respectively.  
 
5.1 FDIR Analysis 
In VirSat FDIR, just as the fault and recovery models, 
Components can also be tagged by analysis and 
requirements Categories. The analysis Categories 
reference the fault element to be analysed.  Furthermore, 
the requirements Categories reference the analysis 
elements and impose expected values on them. 
VirSat FDIR currently supports two forms of analysis: 
- ReliabilityAnalysis. Reliability is a quantitative 
property. It is determined by the probability that a 
system is still functional after  
a given timeframe t has passed. Also computed for 
this Category is the Mean Time To Failure 
(MTTF). The MTTF is the expected time until the 
fault under analysis occurs. For this analysis all 
BasicEvent Categories require to be supplied with 
failure rate data. 
- MCSAnalysis. The Minimum Cut Set (MCS) 
Analysis is a qualitative form of analysis. A MCS is 
a minimum set of BasicEvents that can lead to the 
occurrence of the fault under analysis. The fault 
model does not need to be refined to the point of 
having failure rate data available. Also computed in 
this analysis is the fault tolerance: The size of the 
smallest MCS. 
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Figure 7. The CDM section for modelling FDIR 
requirements and analysis 
Mirroring the analysis model, the requirements model 
provides two Categories: One for imposing expected 
results on the ReliabilityAnalysis and one for imposing 
expected results on the MCSAnalysis. The overall CDM 
is depicted in Fig. 7. On this basis, automatic V&V is 
now performed as follows: Whenever an analysis result 
changes, VirSat FDIR executes an automatic validator 
that checks the fulfilment of the FDIR requirements. It 
then creates warnings for non-fulfilled requirements.  
 
5.2 Configuration Control 
When designing space systems, it is often not the case 
that the entire system has to be designed from scratch. 
Parts of previous studies, product definitions and many 
other design artefacts have a high potential for reuse. 
This holds especially when considering a series of space 
systems [1]. VirSat4 FDIR comes with a Product 
Structure CDM for describing the system decomposition 
allowing for the reuse of designed products. Considered 
here is a simplified version depicted in Fig. 8.  
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Figure 8. Simplified Product Structures CDM 
A ProductTree (PT) represents a container for product 
definitions, called the ElementDefinitions (ED). An ED 
abstractly represents a Component (Product). A 
ConfigurationTree (CT) represents a concrete instance 
of the system, i.e. the satellite model, and contains 
ElementConfigurations (EC). ECs can be typed by EDs 
and inherit their Categories. In particular, fault 
Categories can be assigned to EDs. In this manner, 
product level FTA can be reused over multiple ECs and 
also over multiple missions, each with their own CT. 
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Figure 9. Example of a Product Tree and a derived 
Configuration Tree 
 Fig. 9 illustrates an example of constructing an FT over 
a product structure with two ECs typed by one ED.  
 
6. FDIR ARTIFACT GENERATION 
To increase the value of created FDIR models and to 
reduce the effort in creating them, VirSat FDIR aims to 
generate derivable information from the models. 
Currently, the tool supports the generation of recovery 
models focusing on increasing system reliability and on 
the generation of FMEA tables. In the future, we aim to 
generate entire FDIR reports from the FDIR model. 
 
6.1 Generation of Recovery Models 
In VirSat FDIR, we have implemented the methodology 
reported in [3]. This allows the generation of RAs from 
non-deterministic FTs. Typically, gates in FTs are 
interpreted deterministically. However, this requires the 
designing engineer to know a-priori the optimal strategy 
for managing the redundancies. In non-deterministic 
FTs SPARE gates do not simply claim spares 
deterministically from left to right. Instead, they claim 
according to the ClaimActions by an RA. By 
transforming a non-deterministic FT into a Markov 
Automaton and optimizing its schedule, a reliability 
optimal RA can be generated from the fault model. 
 
6.2 Generation of FMEA tables 
FTs are one of many ways for describing fault relations. 
While they are powerful for precisely describing the 
causes of a fault, in the space industry Failure Modes, 
Effects and Criticality Analysis is the standard go-to 
tool demanded by many standards such as the ECSS. In 
VirSat FDIR we follow the ECSS standard ECSS-Q-
ST-30-02C. To guarantee compatibility with these 
standards, it is necessary to provide a view on the fault 
model through FMEA tables. The solution for obtaining 
an FMEA entry for a given Fault equipped with a FT is 
straightforward. An ECSS compatible FMEA table 
varies depending on the item under consideration, but 
commonly it contains at least the following columns:  
- Item. The name of the fault under consideration. 
- Failure Modes. The direct causes of a fault. In an 
FT these are the basic events of a fault and the 
direct child faults. 
- Failure Causes. The failure modes of the failure 
modes. Hence, they can be computed just as the 
failure modes of the fault under consideration. 
- Probabiliy Level. The probability level can be 
obtained by performing a ReliabilityAnalysis and 
categorizing the result according to a mission 
specific probability level table. 
7. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
In this paper we have presented our approach for 
performing MBSE in the FDIR domain using an FDIR 
CDM. Furthermore, we have introduced our new tool 
VirSat FDIR that implements the presented 
methodology. In the future we plan to expand the CDM 
to also model the aspects for detection. Other interesting 
aspects intended for follow up are the consideration of 
more recovery actions in the recovery model, generation 
of FDIR reports from the FDIR model and we aim to 
bring VirSat FDIR into the later phases of spacecraft 
V&V and design by integrating a simulation based 
FDIR validation approach into VirSat FDIR. 
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